Costs of flexibility and equilibrium selection

DOI10.1016/S0304-4068(97)00810-0zbMath0887.90025MaRDI QIDQ1371180

Bob M. Galesloot, Sanjeev Goyal

Publication date: 28 October 1997

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

equilibrium selectioncoordination gamesPareto-efficient equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Related Items (10)

Non-exclusive conventions and social coordination ⋮ Competing conventions with costly information acquisition ⋮ Sampling best response dynamics and deterministic equilibrium selection ⋮ Contagion and uninvadability in local interaction games: the bilingual game and general supermodular games ⋮ Transitions between equilibria in bilingual games under probit choice ⋮ Noise-independent selection in global games and monotone potential maximizer: a symmetric \(3 \times 3\) example ⋮ On the relationship between robustness to incomplete information and noise-independent selection in global games ⋮ Transitions between equilibria in bilingual games under logit choice ⋮ Stochastically stable states in an oligopoly with differentiated goods: Equivalence of price and quantity strategies ⋮ Cost heterogeneity and the persistence of bilingualism

Cites Work

• Average behavior in learning models
• Non-exclusive conventions and social coordination
• Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• The Evolution of Conventions
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item

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