Adaptive play by idiosyncratic agents

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2003.07.004MaRDI QIDQ705951zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors David P. Myatt, Chris C. Wallace

Publication date 16 February 2005

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:1f1fa2b6-6188-4462-ab42-27ff9a4abe46

zbMATH Keywords

Adaptive playequilibrium selectionpayoff idiosyncrasy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22)

Review text

In this paper a coordination game is considered where trembles are added to payoffs. Hence with some probability it is optimal to act against the flow of play. The long run distribution of population behavior correspond to a stable Bayesian Nash equilibria. As the variance of payoff trembles vanishes a single equilibrium is played almost always in the long run. Kandori, Mailath and Rob and Young have shown that the number of contrary actions required to escape an equilibrium determines selection. In this study the likelihood that such actions are taken is shown to be equally important.

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Cites work

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Cited in

(14)

• Costs of flexibility and equilibrium selection
• A multinomial probit model of stochastic evolution.
• Rapid evolution under inertia
• Game theory analysis of self-awareness and politeness
• SKEW-SYMMETRY UNDER SIMULTANEOUS REVISIONS
• Competing conventions
• Adaptive Play in Multiplayer Bargaining Situations
• Fast Equilibrium Selection by Rational Players Living in a Changing World
• An experimental investigation of stochastic adjustment dynamics
• A behavioral study of ``noise in coordination games
• Learning and equilibrium transitions: stochastic stability in discounted stochastic fictitious play
• Coordination and culture
• Payoff-dependent dynamics and coordination games
• Cycles versus equilibrium in evolutionary games

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