A multinomial probit model of stochastic evolution.

DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00069-3MaRDI QIDQ1421890zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors David P. Myatt, Chris C. Wallace

Publication date 3 February 2004

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Dominated strategiesIdiosyncrasyMultinomial probitStochastic evolution

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3826915 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 47120 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 53571 (Why is no real title available?)
• Adaptive play by idiosyncratic agents
• Basins of Attraction, Long-Run Stochastic Stability, and the Speed of Step-by-Step Evolution
• Evolution with State-Dependent Mutations
• Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: a new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• On the relationship between risk-dominance and stochastic stability
• The Evolution of Conventions
• The Evolution of Walrasian Behavior
• p-Dominance and Belief Potential

Cited in

(23)

• Stochastic stability in assignment problems
• Sample path large deviations for stochastic evolutionary game dynamics
• Hamilton-Jacobi equations with semilinear costs and state constraints, with applications to large deviations in games
• Rapid innovation diffusion in social networks
• Stochastic dynamics and Edmonds' algorithm
• Tributes to Bill Sandholm
• Positive feedback in coordination games: stochastic evolutionary dynamics and the logit choice rule
• Stochastic stability in asymmetric binary choice coordination games
• Musical chairs: Modeling noisy evolution
• Potential games in volatile environments
• Exit from equilibrium in coordination games under probit choice
• Robust stochastic stability
• Coordination games and local interactions: a survey of the game theoretic literature
• Reference-dependent preferences, super-dominance and stochastic stability
• Long-run equilibria with dominated strategies
• A stochastic stability analysis with observation errors in normal form games
• Evolutionary game theory
• Competing conventions with costly information acquisition
• A one-shot deviation principle for stability in matching problems
• On the relationship between \(p\)-dominance and stochastic stability in network games
• Large deviations and multinomial probit choice
• The logit-response dynamics
• Transitions between equilibria in bilingual games under probit choice

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