Conformism across games

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2025.112510MaRDI QIDQ6900522zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Roberto Rozzi

Publication date 12 November 2025

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.ECONLET.2025.112510

zbMATH Keywords

behavioral rulesconformismlocal stability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Cites work

• An evolutionary approach to explaining cooperative behavior by reciprocal incentives
• Categorization and cooperation across games
• Evolution in Bayesian games. II: Stability of purified equilibria
• Evolution of preferences in structured populations: genes, guns, and culture
• Evolution of Preferences1
• Evolution of smart\(_ n\) players
• Evolution of theories of mind
• Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: a new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points
• Homo moralis -- preference evolution under incomplete information and assortative matching
• Nash equilibrium and the evolution of preferences
• On the evolution of individualistic preferences: An incomplete information scenario
• Three steps ahead
• Toward a general theory of peer effects
• Unbeatable imitation
• What to maximize if you must
• Why copy others? Insights from the social learning strategies tournament

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