Strategy stability in complex populations

DOI10.2307/3212954MaRDI QIDQ3919502zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors W. G. S. Hines

Publication date 1980

Published in Journal of Applied Probability (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/3212954

zbMATH Keywords

complex populationsconditional ESSevolutionarily stable strategiesintraspecific conflictsmulticomponent populations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Population dynamics (general) (92D25)

Cited in

(17)

• Evolutionarily stable sets in mixed-strategist models
• Evolutionary stable strategies: A review of basic theory
• Imitator strategies
• A theory for the evolutionary game
• Cross entropy minimization in uninvadable states of complex populations
• An evolutionary interpretation of Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil's experimental results on coordination
• On the evolution of optimizing behavior
• Noisy communication and the evolution of cooperation
• On the neutral stability of mixed strategies in asymmetric contests
• Stability of the replicator equation for a single species with a multi-dimensional continuous trait space
• The ESS for evolutionary matrix games under time constraints and its relationship with the asymptotically stable rest point of the replicator dynamics
• Dynamically stable sets in infinite strategy spaces
• Reinforcement learning in population games
• Stability of the replicator equation with continuous strategy space
• Evolutionary dynamics in frequency-dependent two-phenotype models
• Dynamical aspects of evolutionary stability
• Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics

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