Satisficing behavior, Brouwer's fixed point theorem and Nash equilibrium

DOI10.1007/S00199-004-0519-ZzbMATH Open1097.91005OpenAlexW2025423853MaRDI QIDQ1780907FDOQ1780907

Authors: Robert A. Becker, Subir K. Chakrabarti 

Publication date: 14 June 2005

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-004-0519-z

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zbMATH Keywords

bimatrix gamesCournot duopolybest responsesbetter responsesweighted expected utility

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

Cited In (10)

• A generalization of quantal response equilibrium via perturbed utility
• Lipschitz range in an elementary proof of the Brouwer fixed point theorem, and a proof of the Nash equilibrium
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• Business value and risk in the presence of price controls: an option-based analysis of margin squeeze rules in the telecommunications industry
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• Essential components of Nash equilibria for games parametrized by payoffs and strategies
• Dynamics of the Nash map in the game of Matching Pennies
• Nash and Walras equilibrium via Brouwer
• On the robustness of the competitive equilibrium: utility-improvements and equilibrium points
• Bayesian general equilibrium

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