Satisficing behavior, Brouwer's fixed point theorem and Nash equilibrium

DOI10.1007/S00199-004-0519-ZMaRDI QIDQ1780907zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Robert A. Becker, Subir K. Chakrabarti

Publication date 14 June 2005

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-004-0519-z

zbMATH Keywords

bimatrix gamesCournot duopolybest responsesbetter responsesweighted expected utility

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

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• Dynamics of the Nash map in the game of Matching Pennies
• On the robustness of the competitive equilibrium: utility-improvements and equilibrium points

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