Nash implementation theory - a note on full characterizations
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Publication:709076
DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2010.05.019zbMATH Open1196.91024OpenAlexW1994479418MaRDI QIDQ709076FDOQ709076
Authors: Ville Korpela 
Publication date: 15 October 2010
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2010.05.019
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Cites Work
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
- Implementation Via Nash Equilibria
- A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation
- On Nash implementation of social choice correspondences
- On the necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementation
- Maskin's theorem with limited veto power
Cited In (11)
- On Nash implementation of social choice correspondences
- A simple sufficient condition for strong implementation
- Implementation without rationality assumptions
- Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization
- Implementation Via Nash Equilibria
- The implementation of social choice functions via social choice correspondences: A general formulation and a limit result
- A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation
- Full Nash implementation of neutral social functions
- Nash implementation in private good economies with single-plateaued preferences and in matching problems
- A full characterization of Nash implementation with strategy space reduction
- Reconsidering two-agent Nash implementation
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