Damned if you do and damned if you don't: two masters

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2018.05.016MaRDI QIDQ1622352zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Rohan Dutta, David K. Levine, Salvatore Modica

Publication date 19 November 2018

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://www1.unipa.it/modica/TwoMastersPublished.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

coalition formationgroupcommon agency

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Common Agency
• Competition between asymmetrically informed principals
• Common agency with informed principals: menus \textit{and} signals
• Negotiation and take it or leave it in common agency.
• Principals competing for an agent in the presence of adverse selection and moral hazard

Cites work

• Conflict and cooperation. The structure of equilibrium payoffs in common agency
• Discontinuous Games and Endogenous Sharing Rules
• Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
• Selecting equilibria in common agency games

Cited in

(4)

• Common Agency
• X-games
• Common agency with informed principals: menus \textit{and} signals
• Costly rewards and punishments

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