Damned if you do and damned if you don't: two masters

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2018.05.016zbMATH Open1417.91161OpenAlexW2787648084MaRDI QIDQ1622352FDOQ1622352

Authors: Rohan Dutta, David K. Levine, Salvatore Modica 

Publication date: 19 November 2018

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www1.unipa.it/modica/TwoMastersPublished.pdf

Recommendations

• Common Agency
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zbMATH Keywords

coalition formationgroupcommon agency

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Discontinuous Games and Endogenous Sharing Rules
• Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
• Conflict and cooperation. The structure of equilibrium payoffs in common agency
• Selecting equilibria in common agency games

Cited In (4)

• Costly rewards and punishments
• X-games
• Common agency with informed principals: menus \textit{and} signals
• Common Agency

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