Pricing, routing, and incentive compatibility in multiserver queues
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Publication:1266679
DOI10.1016/0377-2217(95)00265-0zbMath0913.90103MaRDI QIDQ1266679
Publication date: 31 May 1999
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0377-2217(95)00265-0
congestion; pricing; revelation principle; incentive compatibility; assignment of customers to servers
Related Items
Risk sharing and information revelation mechanism of a one-manufacturer and one-retailer supply chain facing an integrated competitor, The Aumann-Shapley price mechanism for allocating congestion costs, Optimal pricing for service facilities with self-optimizing customers
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