Analysis of a dynamic adverse selection model with asymptotic efficiency
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5524143
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Cites work
- A Dynamic Principal-Agent Model with Hidden Information: Sequential Optimality Through Truthful State Revelation
- A recursive formulation for repeated agency with history dependence
- A simple status quo that ensures participation (with application to efficient bargaining)
- Computing Supergame Equilibria
- Dynamic contracting with persistent shocks
- Dynamic games with hidden actions and hidden states
- Dynamic mechanism design with hidden income and hidden actions
- Dynamic supplier contracts under asymmetric inventory information
- Multi-period contracts between principal and agent with adverse selection
- Numerical Methods for Delay Differential Equations
- Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
Cited in
(5)- Solving an infinite horizon adverse selection model through finite policy graphs
- Trading dynamics with private buyer signals in the market for lemons
- Multiagent mechanism design without money
- Study of insurance contract model with cash deposit based on ex-ante asymmetric information
- Efficient Sorting in a Dynamic Adverse-Selection Model
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