Forgiving-Proof Equilibrium in Infinitely Repeated Games

DOI10.2202/1935-1704.1440MaRDI QIDQ3398207zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors

Publication date 26 September 2009

Published in The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2202/1935-1704.1440

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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Cited in

(5)

• Extending renegotiation-proofness to infinite horizon games
• A generalization of the stability of equilibrium in a repeated game
• Renegotiation perfection in infinite games
• Infinite sequential Nash equilibrium
• Folk theorem under bankruptcy

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