A note on renegotiation in repeated Bertrand duopolies

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2006.11.014zbMATH1255.91034OpenAlexW2031250419MaRDI QIDQ1934072FDOQ1934072

Authors Ola Andersson, Erik Wengström

Publication date 28 January 2013

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2006.11.014

zbMATH Keywords

noncooperative game theoryweak renegotiation-proofnessrepeated Bertrand games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Noncooperative games (91A10) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Special types of economic equilibria (91B52)

Recommendations

• Renegotiation in a repeated Cournot duopoly
• Costly renegotiation in repeated Bertrand games
• Renegotiation in the repeated Cournot model
• Renegotiation and symmetry in repeated games
• On renegotiation-proof equilibria in finitely repeated games

Cites work

• Renegotiation in repeated games
• Renegotiation-proof equilibria in repeated prisoners' dilemma

Cited in

(3)

• Renegotiation in a repeated Cournot duopoly
• Renegotiation-proof relational contracts
• Costly renegotiation in repeated Bertrand games

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