On renegotiation-proof collusion under imperfect public information

DOI10.1006/JETH.1998.2500MaRDI QIDQ1290841zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Kiho Yoon

Publication date 12 November 2000

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1998.2500

zbMATH Keywords

collusionCournot-Nash equilibriumrenegotiation-proof equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Special types of economic equilibria (91B52)

Recommendations

• On renegotiation-proof equilibrium under imperfect monitoring
• Renegotiation in the repeated Cournot model
• Undominated Nash implementation with collusion and renegotiation

Cites work

• Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
• On renegotiation-proof equilibrium under imperfect monitoring
• Renegotiation in repeated games
• Renegotiation-proof equilibria in repeated prisoners' dilemma

Cited in

(2)

• On the feasibility of maximal collusion
• Collusion, renegotiation and implementation

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