On renegotiation-proof collusion under imperfect public information

DOI10.1006/JETH.1998.2500zbMATH Open0947.91063OpenAlexW2034601175MaRDI QIDQ1290841FDOQ1290841

Kiho Yoon

Publication date: 12 November 2000

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1998.2500

zbMATH Keywords

collusionCournot-Nash equilibriumrenegotiation-proof equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Special types of economic equilibria (91B52)

Cites Work

• Renegotiation in repeated games
• Renegotiation-proof equilibria in repeated prisoners' dilemma
• Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
• On renegotiation-proof equilibrium under imperfect monitoring

Cited In (2)

• On the feasibility of maximal collusion
• Collusion, renegotiation and implementation

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