A note on forward induction in a model of representative democracy.
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Publication:1420511
DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00148-9zbMath1069.91023OpenAlexW3122705177MaRDI QIDQ1420511
Publication date: 2 February 2004
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(03)00148-9
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Cites Work
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- Persistent equilibria in strategic games
- Signaling, forward induction, and stability in finitely repeated games
- Stable equilibria and forward induction
- The small worlds axiom for stable equilibria
- Stability and the chain store paradox
- Sophisticated voting and equilibrium refinements under plurality rule
- Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
- Stable Equilibria—A Reformulation
- An Economic Model of Representative Democracy
- A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates
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