Delegation and the regulation of risk

DOI10.1006/GAME.1997.0623MaRDI QIDQ1268644zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Susanne Lohmann, Hugo A. Hopenhayn

Publication date 5 May 1999

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170829-160244581

zbMATH Keywords

regulatory decision making

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

Recommendations

• Optimal Delegation
• A signaling theory of congressional oversight
• The Life Cycle of Regulatory Agencies: Dynamic Capture and Transaction Costs
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4025100

Cites work

• Competitive lobbying for a legislator's vote
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4078557 (Why is no real title available?)
• Observable Contracts: Strategic Delegation and Cooperation
• Sequential Equilibria

Cited in

(4)

• Risk trading, network topology and banking regulation
• The Life Cycle of Regulatory Agencies: Dynamic Capture and Transaction Costs
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7640913 (Why is no real title available?)
• Agency Conflicts and Risk Management*

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