Plausible equilibria and backward payoff-keeping behavior

DOI10.1007/978-981-13-0605-1_3MaRDI QIDQ1626430zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yuhki Hosoya

Publication date 27 November 2018

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-0605-1_3

zbMATH Keywords

backward payoff-keeping behaviorchain store paradoxdegree of implausibilitymaximin criteriaplausible equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Noncooperative games (91A10) Games in extensive form (91A18) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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Cited in

(1)

• Stability and the chain store paradox

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