Equilibrium exit in stochastically declining industries

DOI10.1016/0899-8256(89)90004-3zbMath0755.90010OpenAlexW1989494372MaRDI QIDQ1191822

Lode Li, Charles H. Fine

Publication date: 27 September 1992

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/47772

zbMATH Keywords

exit gamepure strategy subgame-perfect equilibriastochastically declining industries

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Discrete-time Markov processes on general state spaces (60J05) Dynamic programming (90C39) Economic growth models (91B62) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Stochastic systems in control theory (general) (93E03)

Related Items (6)

A theory of stopping time games with applications to product innovations and asset sales ⋮ An application of Ramsey theorem to stopping games. ⋮ Strategic investment under uncertainty: a synthesis ⋮ Deterministic multi-player Dynkin games. ⋮ Subgame perfect equilibria in stopping games ⋮ Continuous-time games of timing

Cites Work

• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• A Theory of Exit in Duopoly
• Monotone stopping games
• A Nonzero-Sum Extension of Dynkin's Stopping Problem
• Optimal Stopping in Sequential Games With or Without a Constraint of Always Terminating
• Sequential Equilibria
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item

This page was built for publication: Equilibrium exit in stochastically declining industries