Strategy-proofness, Pareto optimality and strictly convex norms

DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(99)00031-1zbMath0964.91011OpenAlexW2142858253MaRDI QIDQ1566508

Hans van der Stel

Publication date: 16 July 2001

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4896(99)00031-1

zbMATH Keywords

Pareto optimalitystrategy-proofnessanonymityconvex normsequality of powermedian schemes

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (2)

Monotonic norms and orthogonal issues in multidimensional voting ⋮ Strategy-proofness, Pareto optimality and strictly convex norms

Cites Work

• Nonmanipulability in two dimensions
• Pareto optimality, anonymity, and strategy-proofness in location problems
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Generalized median voter schemes and committees
• Strategy-proofness, Pareto optimality and strictly convex norms
• Generalized median solutions, strategy-proofness and strictly convex norms
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Straightforward Elections, Unanimity and Phantom Voters
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