Nonmanipulability in two dimensions
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Publication:802458
DOI10.1016/0165-4896(84)90059-3zbMATH Open0558.90010OpenAlexW1991731552MaRDI QIDQ802458FDOQ802458
Publication date: 1984
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(84)90059-3
Cites Work
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- Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
- Properties of consistent voting systems
- Straightforward Elections, Unanimity and Phantom Voters
- Necessary and sufficient conditions for a resolution of the social choice paradox
Cited In (15)
- Monotonic norms and orthogonal issues in multidimensional voting
- Strategy-proof probabilistic mechanisms in economies with pure public goods.
- Voting on multiple issues: What to put on the ballot?
- Generalized median solutions, strategy-proofness and strictly convex norms
- Optimality of the coordinate-wise median mechanism for strategyproof facility location in two dimensions
- Truthful aggregation of budget proposals
- Efficient and strategy-proof voting rules: A characterization
- Strategy-proofness, Pareto optimality and strictly convex norms
- Spatial implementation
- Arrow's possibility theorem for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences
- Anonymous voting and minimal manipulability
- Strategy-proofness and ``median voters
- Range convexity, continuity, and strategy-proofness of voting schemes
- The publications of Ki Hang Kim
- Pareto optimality, anonymity, and strategy-proofness in location problems
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