Voting for Committees in Agreeable Societies

MaRDI QIDQ2939700zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors

Publication date 22 January 2015

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1402.0861

zbMATH Keywords

agreeable societyJohnson graphvoting system

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Graph representations (geometric and intersection representations, etc.) (05C62) Random graphs (graph-theoretic aspects) (05C80) Voting theory (91B12)

Abstract: We examine the following voting situation. A committee of $k$ people is to be formed from a pool of n candidates. The voters selecting the committee will submit a list of $j$ candidates that they would prefer to be on the committee. We assume that $jleqk<n$. For a chosen committee, a given voter is said to be satisfied by that committee if her submitted list of $j$ candidates is a subset of that committee. We examine how popular is the most popular committee. In particular, we show there is always a committee that satisfies a certain fraction of the voters and examine what characteristics of the voter data will increase that fraction.

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Cited in

(14)

• Committees, sequential voting and transparency
• The Condorcet criterion and committee selection
• Consensus rules for committee elections
• Democracy for polarized committees: the tale of Blotto's lieutenants
• Coincidence of Condorcet committees
• Voting in large committees with disesteem payoffs: a `state of the art' model
• Piercing numbers in approval voting
• Justified representation in approval-based committee voting
• Voting in agreeable societies
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 140122 (Why is no real title available?)
• Approval Voting in Product Societies
• Representative committees of peers
• A theory of voting patterns and performance in private and public committees
• Egalitarianism and utilitarianism in committees of representatives

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