Power set extensions of dichotomous preferences
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Cites work
- A characterization of strategy-proof voting rules for separable weak orderings
- A note on Bossert, Pattanaik and Xu's ``Choice under complete uncertainty: axiomatic characterization of some decision rules
- A Representation Theorem for "Preference for Flexibility"
- An efficiency characterization of plurality social choice on simple preference domains
- Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment
- Between liberalism and democracy.
- Choice under complete uncertainty: Axiomatic characterizations of some decision rules
- Coalition formation games with separable preferences.
- Collective choice under dichotomous preferences
- Extending an order on a set to the power set: Some remarks on Kannai and Peleg's approach
- Handbook of social choice and welfare. Vol. 1.
- Incomplete preferences and the preference for flexibility
- Median-based extensions of an ordering over a set to the power set: An axiomatic characterization
- More on preference and freedom
- On diversity and freedom of choice
- On some axioms for ranking sets of alternatives
- On the question ``who is a \(J\)?: a social choice approach
- Preference for flexibility and random choice
- Procedural group identification
- Random Matching Under Dichotomous Preferences
- Ranking opportunity sets: an approach based on the preference for flexibility
- Ranking opportunity sets: An axiomatic approach
- Sequentially consistent rules of choice under complete uncertainty
- Simple priorities and core stability in hedonic games
- Stability and voting by committees with exit
- Voting by Committees
- Voting for voters: A model of electoral evolution
- Welfare, preference and freedom
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