Efficiency and income redistribution in the single-peaked preferences model with several commodities

DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(99)00047-6zbMath0922.90022OpenAlexW2167100230WikidataQ127724581 ScholiaQ127724581MaRDI QIDQ1292347

Pablo Amorós

Publication date: 21 June 1999

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(99)00047-6

zbMATH Keywords

single-peaked preferencesWalrasian equilibrium with slacks

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Cites Work

• Strategy-proof voting on compact ranges
• Generalized median voter schemes and committees
• Resource-monotonic solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
• Consistent solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
• Voting under constraints
• Two derivations of the uniform rule and an application to bankruptcy
• Population-monotonic solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
• A simple characterization of the uniform rule
• Single-peaked preferences with several commodities
• The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule

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