On the invariance of the set of stable matchings with respect to substitutable preference profiles
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Publication:2482670
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Cites work
- A Fixed-Point Approach to Stable Matchings and Some Applications
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Conflict and Coincidence of Interest in Job Matching: Some New Results and Open Questions
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3796014 (Why is no real title available?)
- Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
- On preferences over subsets and the lattice structure of stable matchings
- Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
- The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics
- The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings with Multiple Partners
Cited in
(6)- Single agents and the set of many-to-one stable matchings
- On testing substitutability
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- Quasi-stability notions in two-sided matching models
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