On the invariance of the set of stable matchings with respect to substitutable preference profiles

DOI10.1007/S00182-007-0080-7MaRDI QIDQ2482670zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors R. Martínez, Jordi Massó, Alejandro Neme, Jorge Oviedo

Publication date 23 April 2008

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://ddd.uab.cat/record/143634

zbMATH Keywords

MatchingSemilatticeStabilitySubstitutable preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Review text

The purpose of the paper is to give, for each substitutable preference profile of the many-to-one matching model, a systematic procedure to distinguish between those orderings (on pairs of subsets of workers in the preferences of firms) that are irrelevant for the set of stable matchings from those that, if inverted, the set of stable matchings changes.

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Cites work

• A Fixed-Point Approach to Stable Matchings and Some Applications
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Conflict and Coincidence of Interest in Job Matching: Some New Results and Open Questions
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3796014 (Why is no real title available?)
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
• On preferences over subsets and the lattice structure of stable matchings
• Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
• The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics
• The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings with Multiple Partners

Cited in

(6)

• Single agents and the set of many-to-one stable matchings
• On testing substitutability
• Testing substitutability of weak preferences
• Quasi-stability notions in two-sided matching models
• On the invariance of the set of core matchings with respect to preference profiles
• On the invariance of male optimal stable matching

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