On the invariance of the set of stable matchings with respect to substitutable preference profiles
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Publication:2482670
DOI10.1007/s00182-007-0080-7zbMath1139.91026OpenAlexW2021633815MaRDI QIDQ2482670
Alejandro Neme, Jordi Massó, Ruth Martínez, Jorge A. Oviedo
Publication date: 23 April 2008
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://ddd.uab.cat/record/143634
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