Winner determination and manipulation in minisum and minimax committee elections

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-23114-3_28zbMATH Open1405.91143OpenAlexW2294076618MaRDI QIDQ3449552FDOQ3449552

Authors: Dorothea Baumeister, Sophie Dennisen, L. Rey 

Publication date: 4 November 2015

Published in: Algorithmic Decision Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-23114-3_28

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zbMATH Keywords

complexitymanipulationcomputational social choicewinner determinationcommittee elections

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) (68Q17) Voting theory (91B12)

Cited In (8)

• Using sub-majoritarian rules to select the winner of a competition
• Robustness among multiwinner voting rules
• Multiwinner analogues of the plurality rule: axiomatic and algorithmic perspectives
• Multi-winner approval voting with grouped voters
• Mathematical programming formulations for the efficient solution of the \(k\)-sum approval voting problem
• How hard is it to tell which is a Condorcet committee?
• Multi-winner Election Control via Social Influence
• PTAS for minimax approval voting

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