Winner determination and manipulation in minisum and minimax committee elections

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-23114-3_28MaRDI QIDQ3449552zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Dorothea Baumeister, Sophie Dennisen, L. Rey

Publication date 4 November 2015

Published in Algorithmic Decision Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-23114-3_28

zbMATH Keywords

complexitymanipulationcomputational social choicewinner determinationcommittee elections

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) (68Q17) Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• How hard is it to tell which is a Condorcet committee?
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Cited in

(8)

• Using sub-majoritarian rules to select the winner of a competition
• Multi-winner approval voting with grouped voters
• Mathematical programming formulations for the efficient solution of the \(k\)-sum approval voting problem
• Multi-winner Election Control via Social Influence
• PTAS for minimax approval voting
• How hard is it to tell which is a Condorcet committee?
• Robustness among multiwinner voting rules
• Multiwinner analogues of the plurality rule: axiomatic and algorithmic perspectives

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