Winner determination and manipulation in minisum and minimax committee elections

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-23114-3_28MaRDI QIDQ3449552zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Dorothea Baumeister, Sophie Dennisen, L. Rey

Publication date 4 November 2015

Published in Algorithmic Decision Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-23114-3_28

zbMATH Keywords

committee electionscomplexitycomputational social choicemanipulationwinner determination

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) (68Q17) Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

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Cited in

(8)

• Mathematical programming formulations for the efficient solution of the \(k\)-sum approval voting problem
• Using sub-majoritarian rules to select the winner of a competition
• Multiwinner analogues of the plurality rule: axiomatic and algorithmic perspectives
• PTAS for minimax approval voting
• How hard is it to tell which is a Condorcet committee?
• Multi-winner Election Control via Social Influence
• Robustness among multiwinner voting rules
• Multi-winner approval voting with grouped voters

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