A note on the Condorcet jury theorem with supermajority voting rules

DOI10.1007/s003550200157zbMath1073.91555OpenAlexW2077288384MaRDI QIDQ2568781

Mark Fey

Publication date: 19 October 2005

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550200157

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

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