Individual rights and collective responsibility: The rights-egalitarian solution
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Publication:1296510
DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(98)00017-1zbMath0953.91008WikidataQ127719419 ScholiaQ127719419MaRDI QIDQ1296510
Antonio Villar, Michael Maschler, Carmen Herrero
Publication date: 1 February 2001
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Cooperative games (91A12) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Social choice (91B14)
Related Items (26)
Integer solutions to bankruptcy problems with non-integer claims ⋮ On surplus-sharing in partnerships ⋮ HOW TO COPE WITH DIVISION PROBLEMS UNDER INTERVAL UNCERTAINTY OF CLAIMS? ⋮ Non-manipulable division rules in claim problems and generalizations ⋮ Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey. ⋮ On the linearity property for allocation problems and bankruptcy problems ⋮ New results for multi-issue allocation problems and their solutions ⋮ Filling a multicolor urn: An axiomatic analysis. ⋮ Additive rules in bankruptcy problems and other related problems. ⋮ Characterization of linear symmetric solutions for allocation problems ⋮ Families of sequential priority rules and random arrival rules with withdrawal limits ⋮ HOW TO HANDLE INTERVAL SOLUTIONS FOR COOPERATIVE INTERVAL GAMES ⋮ Flow sharing and bankruptcy games ⋮ The rights egalitarian solution for NTU sharing problems ⋮ Michael Maschler's bibliography ⋮ Additive rules in discrete allocation problems ⋮ Minimal rights based solidarity ⋮ Constrained welfare egalitarianism in surplus-sharing problems ⋮ Up methods in the allocation of indivisibilities when preferences are single-peaked ⋮ On demand responsiveness in additive cost sharing ⋮ Composition properties in the river claims problem ⋮ The three musketeers: four classical solutions to bankruptcy problems. ⋮ Nonsymmetric equal sacrifice solutions for claim problem. ⋮ The proportional rule for problems with constraints and claims. ⋮ Characterization of the Reverse Talmud bankruptcy rule by exemption and exclusion properties ⋮ Parametric rationing methods
Cites Work
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