Characterization of the Reverse Talmud bankruptcy rule by exemption and exclusion properties

DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2013.01.052zbMath1317.91045MaRDI QIDQ2355089

Gerard van der Laan, Yukihiko Funaki, René van den Brink

Publication date: 28 July 2015

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2013.01.052

zbMATH Keywords

game theory; decision support systems; economics; exclusion; bankruptcy rules; exemption

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A12: Cooperative games

91B32: Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.)

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Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: an update, Rationing in the presence of baselines

Cites Work

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