Decisions by players of comparable strength

DOI10.1007/BF01282564zbMath0576.90105MaRDI QIDQ3696901

Axel Ostmann

Publication date: 1985

Published in: Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

desirabilityefficiencystrengthcooperative game theoryweighted majority gamesveto playerordered constant-sum gamesordered games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (4)

Load balancing in quorum systems ⋮ Forms of representation for simple games: sizes, conversions and equivalences ⋮ Sets uniquely determined by projections on axes. II: Discrete case ⋮ On the existence of a minimum integer representation for weighted voting systems

Cites Work

• A class of simple games
• On the minimal representation of homogeneous games
• A theory of coalition formation in committees
• A characterization, existence proof and dimension bounds for the kernel of a game
• The Counting Vector of a Simple Game
• The Counting Vector of a Simple Game

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