Decisions by players of comparable strength

DOI10.1007/BF01282564zbMATH Open0576.90105MaRDI QIDQ3696901FDOQ3696901

Authors: Axel Ostmann 

Publication date: 1985

Published in: Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie (Search for Journal in Brave)

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zbMATH Keywords

desirabilityefficiencycooperative game theoryweighted majority gamesstrengthveto playerordered constant-sum gamesordered games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Cooperative games (91A12)

Cites Work

• A characterization, existence proof and dimension bounds for the kernel of a game
• A class of simple games
• On the minimal representation of homogeneous games
• The Counting Vector of a Simple Game
• A theory of coalition formation in committees
• The Counting Vector of a Simple Game

Cited In (5)

• Sets uniquely determined by projections on axes. II: Discrete case
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• On the existence of a minimum integer representation for weighted voting systems
• Load balancing in quorum systems
• Forms of representation for simple games: sizes, conversions and equivalences

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