Decisions by players of comparable strength (Q3696901)

From MaRDI portal

!

This is the item page for this Wikibase entity, intended for internal use and editing purposes. Please use the normal view instead:

scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3922411
Language Label Description Also known as
default for all languages
No label defined
    English
    Decisions by players of comparable strength
    scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3922411

      Statements

      Decisions by players of comparable strength (English)
      0 references
      0 references
      1985
      0 references
      efficiency
      0 references
      cooperative game theory
      0 references
      strength
      0 references
      desirability
      0 references
      veto player
      0 references
      ordered games
      0 references
      ordered constant-sum games
      0 references
      weighted majority games
      0 references
      The author introduces the aspect of efficiency in cooperative game theory. He focuses on two different scales for measuring the strength of the players. This is begun by considering the desirability relation among the players of a given cooperative game. He calls the game ordered if the desirability relation is linear. The introductory results of simple games duality and constant sum are given in the second section. He introduces the notation of veto player related with a related property of the characteristic function. The desirability relation is introduced. He states a theorem due to Maschler- Peleg that the desirability relation is reflexive and transitive. Next he presents some ordered games. He compares coalitions and Aumann's ordered game is analyzed. The desirability in the dual game is studied. He remarks on other concepts of strength. He considered the indices of Shapley and Banzhaf which he says that they induce the same order on the players as the strong desirability relation. The kernel and the nucleoulus preserve the desirability relation but not the strong desirability relation. Further he studies decisions by votes. Finally he obtains the main result stating that the set of ordered constant-sum games is not a subset of weighted majority games.
      0 references

      Identifiers