Simple voting games and cartel damage proportioning

DOI10.3390/g12040074zbMath1484.91024OpenAlexW3202992364MaRDI QIDQ2669112

Dominik Welter, Stefan Napel

Publication date: 9 March 2022

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g12040074

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley-Shubik indexsimple voting gamescartel damage allocationrelative responsibility

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Cites Work

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• Dimension of the Lisbon voting rules in the EU council: a challenge and new world record
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• On weighted Shapley values
• The trouble with the second quantifier
• Ethnic distribution, effective power and conflict
• Weighted voting, abstention, and multiple levels of approval
• How to share joint liability: a cooperative game approach
• On the inverse power index problem
• Game Theory

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