Simple voting games and cartel damage proportioning

DOI10.3390/G12040074MaRDI QIDQ2669112zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Stefan Napel, Dominik Welter

Publication date 9 March 2022

Published in Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3390/g12040074

zbMATH Keywords

cartel damage allocationrelative responsibilityShapley-Shubik indexsimple voting games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

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Cited in

(1)

• Anticompetitive traps and voting

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