A new axiomatization of the Shapley-solidarity value for games with a coalition structure

DOI10.1016/J.ORL.2017.12.006MaRDI QIDQ2417092zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Xunfeng Hu, Dengfeng Li

Publication date 11 June 2019

Published in Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2017.12.006

zbMATH Keywords

coalition structureOwen valuetransferable utility cooperative gameShapley-solidarity value

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Operations research, mathematical programming (90-XX)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3614541 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
• A solidarity value for n-person transferable utility games
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• Cooperative games with coalition structures
• Linear efficient and symmetric values for TU-games: sharing the joint gain of cooperation
• Modeling values for TU-games using generalized versions of consistency, standardness and the null player property
• Monotonic solutions of cooperative games
• Null, nullifying, or dummifying players: the difference between the Shapley value, the equal division value, and the equal surplus division value
• On a class of solidarity values
• On weighted Shapley values
• Owen coalitional value without additivity axiom
• Population monotonic allocation schemes for cooperative games with transferable utility
• The Shapley-solidarity value for games with a coalition structure
• The consensus value: a new solution concept for cooperative games
• The principle of balanced contributions and hierarchies of cooperation
• Whose deletion does not affect your payoff? The difference between the Shapley value, the egalitarian value, the solidarity value, and the Banzhaf value

Cited in

(13)

• Corrigendum to: ``A new axiomatization of the Shapley-solidarity value for games with a coalition structure
• The Egalitarian efficient extension of the Aumann-Drèze value
• The coalitional rationality of the Shapley value
• The weighted Shapley-egalitarian value for cooperative games with a coalition structure
• New axiomatizations of the Owen value
• A coalition-structure's generation method for solving cooperative computing problems in edge computing environments
• A new axiomatization of the Owen value for games with coalition structures
• A Shapley value for games with restricted coalitions
• Extension of generalized solidarity values to interval-valued cooperative games
• Two-step Shapley-solidarity value for cooperative games with coalition structure
• Computational Aspects of Extending the Shapley Value to Coalitional Games with Externalities
• The extended and generalized Shapley value: Simultaneous consideration of coalitional externalities and coalitional structure
• Axiomatizations of two types of Shapley values for games on union closed systems

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