Consistency, population solidarity, and egalitarian solutions for TU-games
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Publication:333480
DOI10.1007/S11238-016-9538-ZzbMATH Open1378.91022OpenAlexW2297909558WikidataQ59471829 ScholiaQ59471829MaRDI QIDQ333480FDOQ333480
Authors: René van den Brink, Youngsub Chun, Yukihiko Funaki, Boram Park 
Publication date: 31 October 2016
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-016-9538-z
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Cites Work
- Potential, Value, and Consistency
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Introduction to the Theory of Cooperative Games
- Axiomatizations of a class of equal surplus sharing solutions for TU-games
- Coincidence of and collinearity between game theoretic solutions
- An axiomatization of the Shapley value using a fairness property
- Null or nullifying players: the difference between the Shapley value and equal division solutions
- Duality and anti-duality in TU games applied to solutions, axioms, and axiomatizations
- The core and consistency properties: A general characterisation
- Population solidarity, population fair-ranking, and the egalitarian value
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Reconciling marginalism with egalitarianism: consistency, monotonicity, and implementation of egalitarian Shapley values
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- The consensus value: a new solution concept for cooperative games
- Problems of fair division and the egalitarian solution
- The solidarity axiom for quasilinear social choice problems
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Cited In (33)
- Path monotonicity, consistency and axiomatizations of some weighted solutions
- On egalitarian values for cooperative games with a priori unions
- Compromising between the proportional and equal division values
- Effects of players' nullification and equal (surplus) division values
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Duality and anti-duality in TU games applied to solutions, axioms, and axiomatizations
- Characterizations of weighted and equal division values
- Associated consistency characterization of two linear values for TU games by matrix approach
- Population solidarity, population fair-ranking, and the egalitarian value
- Modeling values for TU-games using generalized versions of consistency, standardness and the null player property
- On the axiomatic approach to sharing the revenues from broadcasting sports leagues
- Nullified equal loss property and equal division values
- Coalitional surplus desirability and the equal surplus division value
- Uncertainty in cooperative interval games: how Hurwicz criterion compatibility leads to egalitarianism
- A new axiomatization of a class of equal surplus division values for TU games
- Redistribution to the less productive: parallel characterizations of the egalitarian Shapley and consensus values
- Axiomatizations of a class of equal surplus sharing solutions for TU-games
- New results on egalitarian values for games with a priori unions
- Some characterizations of egalitarian solutions on classes of TU-games.
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Coalitional desirability and the equal division value
- Duality in land rental problems
- Relationally equal treatment of equals and affine combinations of values for TU games
- Preserving or removing special players: what keeps your payoff unchanged in TU-games?
- Solidarity within a fixed community
- Sharing the surplus and proportional values
- Consistency implies equal treatment in TU-games
- Null, nullifying, or dummifying players: the difference between the Shapley value, the equal division value, and the equal surplus division value
- Consistency, weak fairness, and the Shapley value
- A generalization of the CIS value for cooperative cost games
- Rationality, aggregate monotonicity and consistency in cooperative games: some (im)possibility results
- Balanced externalities and the proportional allocation of nonseparable contributions
- Axiomatizations of the proportional division value
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