Axiomatizations and a Noncooperative Interpretation of the α-CIS Value

DOI10.1142/S0217595915500311zbMath1330.90050MaRDI QIDQ3455875

Han Dai, Haobin Shi, Gen-Jiu Xu

Publication date: 11 December 2015

Published in: Asia-Pacific Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

TU game; axiomatization; equal division solution; bidding mechanism; CIS value

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A12: Cooperative games

90B80: Discrete location and assignment

Related Items

A new axiomatization of a class of equal surplus division values for TU games, Process and optimization implementation of the \(\alpha \)-ENSC value, The family of ideal values for cooperative games, Sharing the surplus and proportional values, Coalitional surplus desirability and the equal surplus division value, The general compromise value for cooperative games with transferable utility

Cites Work

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• Monotonic solutions of cooperative games
• Coincidence of and collinearity between game theoretic solutions
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• Reconciling marginalism with egalitarianism: consistency, monotonicity, and implementation of egalitarian Shapley values
• Null or nullifying players: the difference between the Shapley value and equal division solutions
• Null, nullifying, or dummifying players: the difference between the Shapley value, the equal division value, and the equal surplus division value
• The consensus value: a new solution concept for cooperative games
• Bidding for the surplus: a non-cooperative approach to the Shapley value