A characterization of polyhedral market games

DOI10.1007/BF01737574zbMath0281.90091MaRDI QIDQ1843383

Billera, Louis J., Robert E. Bixby

Publication date: 1973

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A12: Cooperative games

91B16: Utility theory

91A40: Other game-theoretic models

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Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• The Core of an N Person Game
• Some theorems on the core of ann-Game without Side-Payments