Cartelization under present bias and imperfect public signals

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.01.004zbMath1520.91239OpenAlexW4323275748MaRDI QIDQ6173742

Long Cheng, Stuart McDonald, Guangliang Ye

Publication date: 13 July 2023

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.01.004

zbMATH Keywords

time inconsistencycollusionquasi-hyperbolic discountingrepeated oligopolytrigger pricing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54) PDEs in connection with game theory, economics, social and behavioral sciences (35Q91)

Cites Work

• The critical discount factor as a measure for cartel stability?
• Extremal equlibria of oligopolistic supergames
• Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring
• Repeated games with general discounting
• Optimal cartel trigger price strategies
• Repeated games with present-biased preferences
• Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
• On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting
• Dynamic Choices of Hyperbolic Consumers

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