Strongly time-consistent solutions in cooperative dynamic games
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Cites work
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Cited in
(10)- Time consistency of the interval Shapley-like value in dynamic games
- Time-Consistent Equilibria in a Differential Game Model with Time Inconsistent Preferences and Partial Cooperation
- Time consistency of cooperative solutions in dynamic games
- Strongly strategic support of cooperative solutions for games over event trees
- Cooperative dynamic games with control lags
- Strong time-consistent core for a class of linear-state games
- Time consistency in cooperative differential games
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- Strong active solution in non-cooperative games
- A-subgame concept and the solutions properties for multistage games with vector payoffs
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