Strongly time-consistent solutions in cooperative dynamic games
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Publication:5118425
DOI10.1007/978-3-030-39789-0_2zbMATH Open1442.91008OpenAlexW3035008511MaRDI QIDQ5118425FDOQ5118425
Publication date: 8 September 2020
Published in: Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-39789-0_2
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Cites Work
- The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
- Repeated games with incomplete information. With the collaboration of Richard E. Stearns
- Multistage Games with Communication
- Game Theory
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- Subgame consistent economic optimization. An advanced cooperative dynamic game analysis.
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Cited In (6)
- Strong time-consistent core for a class of linear-state games
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Time consistency of cooperative solutions in dynamic games
- Time-Consistent Equilibria in a Differential Game Model with Time Inconsistent Preferences and Partial Cooperation
- Strongly strategic support of cooperative solutions for games over event trees
- Strong active solution in non-cooperative games
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