Dynamic costs and moral hazard: a duality-based approach

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2016.08.002MaRDI QIDQ337786zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Guy Arie

Publication date 3 November 2016

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2016.08.002

zbMATH Keywords

dualitydynamic moral hazardprivate informationdynamic mechanism designnonlinear incentives

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Linear programming (90C05)

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Cited in

(4)

• The ratchet effect: a learning perspective
• Quantifying the social welfare loss in moral hazard models
• Effects of changes in preferences in moral hazard problems
• Moral hazard with non-additive uncertainty: when are actions implementable?

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