Note on Nash equilibria in infinitely repeated games with incomplete information
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Publication:762080
DOI10.1007/BF01769814zbMATH Open0556.90104OpenAlexW2047804223MaRDI QIDQ762080FDOQ762080
Authors: Françoise Forges 
Publication date: 1984
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01769814
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- Infinite sequential Nash equilibrium
- Extensions of the Cav(u) Theorem for Repeated Games with Incomplete Information on One Side
- Long persuasion games
- Games with zero-knowledge signaling
- A characterization of sequential equilibrium strategies in infinitely repeated incomplete information games
- Equilibria in infinite games of incomplete information
- Knowing the informed player's payoffs and simple play in repeated games
- Long information design
- Strategic information exchange
- Nash equilibria of \(n\)-player repeated games with semi-standard information
- Splitting games over finite sets
- MULTISTAGE COMMUNICATION WITH AND WITHOUT VERIFIABLE TYPES
- Designing communication hierarchies
- Repeated Games with Incomplete Information
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- Learning from private information in noisy repeated games
- 3-player repeated games with lack of information on one side
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