Knowing the informed player's payoffs and simple play in repeated games

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2024.105888MaRDI QIDQ6604779zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Takuma Habu, Elliot Lipnowski, Doron Ravid

Publication date 13 September 2024

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamesincomplete informationtransparent motives

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)

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Cites work

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• Bi-convexity and bi-martingales
• Cheap Talk With Transparent Motives
• Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterion
• Infinite dimensional analysis. A hitchhiker's guide.
• Long Cheap Talk
• Nonzero-Sum Two-Person Repeated Games with Incomplete Information
• Nonzero-sum two-person repeated games with incomplete information and known-own payoffs
• Note on Nash equilibria in infinitely repeated games with incomplete information
• Repeated Games
• Repeated games with incomplete information and discounting
• Repeated games with incomplete information. With the collaboration of Richard E. Stearns
• Some Asymptotic Results in Discounted Repeated Games of One-Sided Incomplete Information
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• The existence of equilibria in certain games, separation for families of convex functions and a theorem of Borsuk-Ulam type

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