A characterization of sequential equilibrium strategies in infinitely repeated incomplete information games

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(89)90102-6zbMath0678.90106OpenAlexW2023620005MaRDI QIDQ1124544

James Bergin

Publication date: 1989

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/686.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

bimatrix gameinfinitely repeated standard two-sided incomplete information gamessequential equilibria strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15)

Related Items (4)

Anonymous sequential games: Existence and characterization of equilibria ⋮ Reputation and perfection in repeated common interest games ⋮ Multitrade bargaining ⋮ Competitive equilibria of economies with a continuum of consumers and aggregate shocks

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Nonzero-Sum Two-Person Repeated Games with Incomplete Information
• Sequential Equilibria
• Optimal Behavioral Strategies In 0-Sum Games with Almost Perfect Information
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring

This page was built for publication: A characterization of sequential equilibrium strategies in infinitely repeated incomplete information games