A characterization of sequential equilibrium strategies in infinitely repeated incomplete information games

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(89)90102-6zbMATH Open0678.90106OpenAlexW2023620005MaRDI QIDQ1124544FDOQ1124544

Authors: James Bergin 

Publication date: 1989

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/686.pdf

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zbMATH Keywords

bimatrix gameinfinitely repeated standard two-sided incomplete information gamessequential equilibria strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15)

Cites Work

• Nonzero-Sum Two-Person Repeated Games with Incomplete Information
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Sequential Equilibria
• Optimal Behavioral Strategies In 0-Sum Games with Almost Perfect Information

Cited In (5)

• Anonymous sequential games: Existence and characterization of equilibria
• Equilibria in multi-player multi-outcome infinite sequential games
• Multitrade bargaining
• Reputation and perfection in repeated common interest games
• Competitive equilibria of economies with a continuum of consumers and aggregate shocks

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