A Walrasian approach to bargaining games

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(96)00822-1zbMath1284.91036OpenAlexW1963576577MaRDI QIDQ2442561

Walter Trockel

Publication date: 3 April 2014

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/record/2911505

zbMATH Keywords

bargaining gamesWalrasian equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Related Items (6)

UNIQUE NASH IMPLEMENTATION FOR A CLASS OF BARGAINING SOLUTIONS ⋮ Socio-legal systems and implementation of the Nash solution in Debreu-Hurwicz equilibrium ⋮ Competitive outcomes and endogenous coalition formation in an \(n\)-person game ⋮ Asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions and competitive payoffs ⋮ Competitive outcomes and the inner core of NTU market games ⋮ Competitive equilibrium as a bargaining solution: an axiomatic approach

Cites Work

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• Axiomatic models of bargaining
• The Shapley Value as a von Neumann-Morgenstern Utility
• The Nash Solution and the Utility of Bargaining
• A Generalized Nash Solution for Two-Person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information

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