On choosing which game to play when ignorant of the rules

DOI10.1007/S00199-006-0168-5MaRDI QIDQ2464010zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Murali Agastya

Publication date 10 December 2007

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-006-0168-5

zbMATH Keywords

coalition form gamemarginality principleShapley valueunstructured strategic interaction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Review text

This research work is a contribution to the theory of choice among strategic situations, when the rules of the play are not precise, by considering that a game in coalition form can adequately represent the unstructured strategic interactions. The author introduces an appropriate marginality principle and he presents additional insights to use the Shapley value as a decision rule for making choices in such as these conditions, under significant selected references.

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3395595 (Why is no real title available?)
• Multiplayer bargaining situations: A decision theoretic approach
• The Shapley Value as a von Neumann-Morgenstern Utility

Cited in

(1)

• Choice and uncertainty in games

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