On choosing which game to play when ignorant of the rules (Q2464010)

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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5218936
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    On choosing which game to play when ignorant of the rules
    scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5218936

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      On choosing which game to play when ignorant of the rules (English)
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      10 December 2007
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      This research work is a contribution to the theory of choice among strategic situations, when the rules of the play are not precise, by considering that a game in coalition form can adequately represent the unstructured strategic interactions. The author introduces an appropriate marginality principle and he presents additional insights to use the Shapley value as a decision rule for making choices in such as these conditions, under significant selected references.
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      unstructured strategic interaction
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      coalition form game
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      marginality principle
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      Shapley value
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