1-convex extensions of incomplete cooperative games and the average value

DOI10.1007/s11238-023-09946-8arXiv2107.04679OpenAlexW4383868501MaRDI QIDQ6123436

Jan Bok, Martin Černý

Publication date: 4 March 2024

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2107.04679

zbMATH Keywords

uncertaintycooperative gamesShapley valuenucleolussolution conceptsvalues1-convexitytau-valueincomplete cooperative games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Cites Work

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