Selection-based approach to cooperative interval games
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Publication:5281600
Abstract: Cooperative interval games are a generalized model of cooperative games in which the worth of every coalition corresponds to a closed interval representing the possible outcomes of its cooperation. Selections are all possible outcomes of the interval game with no additional uncertainty. We introduce new selection-based classes of interval games and prove their characterization theorems and relations to existing classes based on the interval weakly better operator. We show new results regarding the core and imputations and examine a problem of equivalence for two different versions of the core, the main stability solution of cooperative games. Finally, we introduce the definition of strong imputation and strong core as universal solution concepts of interval games.
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Cited in
(6)- A new approach of cooperative interval games: the interval core and Shapley value revisited
- Cooperative interval games: a survey
- Coalitional interval games for strategic games in which players cooperate
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1538006 (Why is no real title available?)
- Positivity and convexity in incomplete cooperative games
- 1-convex extensions of incomplete cooperative games and the average value
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