Selection-based approach to cooperative interval games

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-27680-9_3zbMATH Open1367.91023arXiv1410.3877OpenAlexW2079943163MaRDI QIDQ5281600FDOQ5281600

Authors: Jan Bok, Milan Hladík 

Publication date: 26 July 2017

Published in: Operations Research and Enterprise Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: Cooperative interval games are a generalized model of cooperative games in which the worth of every coalition corresponds to a closed interval representing the possible outcomes of its cooperation. Selections are all possible outcomes of the interval game with no additional uncertainty. We introduce new selection-based classes of interval games and prove their characterization theorems and relations to existing classes based on the interval weakly better operator. We show new results regarding the core and imputations and examine a problem of equivalence for two different versions of the core, the main stability solution of cooperative games. Finally, we introduce the definition of strong imputation and strong core as universal solution concepts of interval games.

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1410.3877

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Cited In (6)

• A new approach of cooperative interval games: the interval core and Shapley value revisited
• Cooperative interval games: a survey
• Coalitional interval games for strategic games in which players cooperate
• Positivity and convexity in incomplete cooperative games
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• 1-convex extensions of incomplete cooperative games and the average value

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