Threshold tests as quality signals: optimal strategies, equilibria, and Price of anarchy

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-94676-0_17MaRDI QIDQ2152123zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Siddhartha Banerjee, David Kempe, Robert D. Kleinberg

Publication date 6 July 2022

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2110.10881

zbMATH Keywords

signalinginformation elicitationPrice of anarchy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Internet topics (68M11)

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Cites work

• Competitive cheap talk
• Competitive disclosure of correlated information
• Competitive information disclosure by multiple senders
• Limited capacity in project selection: competition through evidence production
• Sequential decisions with tests
• The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, I: Theory
• The optimal choice of pre-launch reviewer

Cited in

(2)

• Informative tests in signaling environments
• Endogenous threshold selection with two-interval restricted tests

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