Hypothesis Testing Under Subjective Priors and Costs as a Signaling Game

DOI10.1109/TSP.2019.2935908MaRDI QIDQ5240478zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Serkan Sarıtaş, Sinan Gezici, Serdar Yüksel

Publication date 28 October 2019

Published in IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1906.04577

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signal theory (characterization, reconstruction, filtering, etc.) (94A12)

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• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 773972

Cited in

(3)

• Threshold tests as quality signals: optimal strategies, equilibria, and Price of anarchy
• Signaling games in multiple dimensions: geometric properties of equilibrium solutions
• Hypothesis Testing under Subjective Priors and Costs as a Signaling Game

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