Environmental corporate social responsibility under price competition and the second‐mover advantage: An endogenous timing approach
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Publication:6180342
Recommendations
- Eco-firms and the sequential adoption of environmental corporate social responsibility in the managerial delegation
- Strategic environmental corporate social responsibility in a differentiated duopoly market
- CSR leadership, spillovers, and first-mover advantage
- Strategic environmental corporate social responsibility (ECSR) certification and endogenous market structure
- Certification of environmental corporate social responsibility activities in differentiated duopoly market
Cites work
- Eco-firms and the sequential adoption of environmental corporate social responsibility in the managerial delegation
- Endogenous price leadership
- Endogenous timing in a mixed duopoly: Price competition
- Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or Cournot equilibria
- Endogenous timing in private and mixed duopolies with emission taxes
- First Mover and Second Mover Advantages
- Managerial delegation contracts, ``green R\&D and emissions taxation
- Price leadership in a homogeneous product market
- Second-mover advantage and price leadership in Bertrand duopoly
- Strategic environmental corporate social responsibility in a differentiated duopoly market
Cited in
(3)- Strategic environmental corporate social responsibility (ECSR) certification and endogenous market structure
- The strategic adoption of environmental corporate social responsibility with network externalities
- Profitable environmental corporate social responsibility under managers' relative profit performance competition
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