Environmental corporate social responsibility under price competition and the second‐mover advantage: An endogenous timing approach
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Publication:6180342
DOI10.1111/ijet.12376MaRDI QIDQ6180342
Publication date: 19 January 2024
Published in: International Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
price competitionsecond-mover advantageenvironmental corporate social responsibilitygreen managerial delegationextensive endogenous timing game
Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) PDEs in connection with game theory, economics, social and behavioral sciences (35Q91) Games of timing (91A55)
Cites Work
- Strategic environmental corporate social responsibility in a differentiated duopoly market
- Price leadership in a homogeneous product market
- Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or Cournot equilibria
- Endogenous timing in private and mixed duopolies with emission taxes
- Endogenous price leadership
- Eco-firms and the sequential adoption of environmental corporate social responsibility in the managerial delegation
- Managerial delegation contracts, ``green R\&D and emissions taxation
- Endogenous timing in a mixed duopoly: Price competition
- Second-mover advantage and price leadership in Bertrand duopoly
- First Mover and Second Mover Advantages
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