Environmental corporate social responsibility under price competition and the second‐mover advantage: An endogenous timing approach

DOI10.1111/IJET.12376MaRDI QIDQ6180342FDOQ6180342

Chul-Hi Park, Sang-Ho Lee

Publication date: 19 January 2024

Published in: International Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

price competitionsecond-mover advantageenvironmental corporate social responsibilitygreen managerial delegationextensive endogenous timing game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

PDEs in connection with game theory, economics, social and behavioral sciences (35Q91) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Games of timing (91A55)

Cites Work

• First Mover and Second Mover Advantages
• Second-mover advantage and price leadership in Bertrand duopoly
• Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or Cournot equilibria
• Endogenous price leadership
• Endogenous timing in a mixed duopoly: Price competition
• Strategic environmental corporate social responsibility in a differentiated duopoly market
• Price leadership in a homogeneous product market
• Endogenous timing in private and mixed duopolies with emission taxes
• Eco-firms and the sequential adoption of environmental corporate social responsibility in the managerial delegation
• Managerial delegation contracts, ``green R\&D and emissions taxation

Cited In (1)

• Profitable environmental corporate social responsibility under managers' relative profit performance competition

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