CSR leadership, spillovers, and first-mover advantage

DOI10.1007/S10203-021-00328-9zbMATH Open1480.91105OpenAlexW3157529651MaRDI QIDQ2064584FDOQ2064584

Authors: Michael Kopel 

Publication date: 6 January 2022

Published in: Decisions in Economics and Finance (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10203-021-00328-9

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zbMATH Keywords

first-mover advantagecorporate social responsibilityintensity of competitionCSR leadershipCSR spillovers

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

Cites Work

• Nonlinear oligopolies. Stability and bifurcations
• A note on price and quantity competition in differentiated oligopolies
• Evolutionary competition in a mixed market with socially concerned firms
• Strategic environmental corporate social responsibility in a differentiated duopoly market
• Commitment, first-mover-, and second-mover advantage
• Complexity and geographical economics. Topics and tools
• Minimum quality standards and consumers' information
• Cartel stability in advertising-intensive and R\&D-intensive industries
• A dynamic model of oligopoly with R\&D externalities along networks. I.
• A dynamic model of oligopoly with R\&D externalities along networks. II
• The persistence of social strategies under increasing competitive pressure

Cited In (1)

• Dynamic corporate social responsibility (CSR) strategies in oligopoly

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