Strategic environmental corporate social responsibility (ECSR) certification and endogenous market structure

DOI10.1515/BEJTE-2022-0139MaRDI QIDQ6131144FDOQ6131144

Authors

Publication date 4 April 2024

Published in The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2301.03291

zbMATH Keywords

price competitionquantity competitionmixed marketsdifferentiated duopolyenvironmental standardscorporate social responsibility certification

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

Abstract: This paper extends the findings of Liu et al. (2015, Strategic environmental corporate social responsibility in a differentiated duopoly market, Economics Letters), along two dimensions. First, we consider the case of endogenous market structure a la Vives and Singh (1984, Price and quantity competition in a differentiated duopoly, The Rand Journal of Economics). Second, we refine the ECSR certification standards in differentiated duopoly with rankings. We find that optimal ECSR certification standards by NGO are the highest in Bertrand competition, followed by mixed markets and the lowest in Cournot competition. Next, NGO certifier will set the ECSR standards below the optimal level. Also, we show that given the ECSR certification standards, there is a possibility of both price and quantity contracts choices by the firms in endogenous market structure.

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• Strategic environmental corporate social responsibility in a differentiated duopoly market
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Cites work

• Corporate social responsibility and privatization policy in a mixed oligopoly
• Private versus public companies with strategic CSR
• Strategic environmental corporate social responsibility in a differentiated duopoly market

Cited in

(2)

• Environmental corporate social responsibility under price competition and the second‐mover advantage: An endogenous timing approach
• The strategic adoption of environmental corporate social responsibility with network externalities

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